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ABSTRACT
This Forum Debate explores the confluence of neoliberal, populist, conser-
vative and reactionary influences on contemporary ideologies and practices
of social policy, with a focus on the poorer peripheries of global capitalism.
Several fundamental tensions are highlighted, which are largely overlooked
by the social policy and development literatures. First, many recent social
policy innovations have been discredited by their association with neolib-
eralism. The rising political Right has been much more successful than the
Left at exploiting this discontent, despite simultaneously deepening many
aspects of neoliberalism once in power. At the same time, right-wing move-
ments have proactively used social policy as a political tool to fashion the
social order along lines deemed amenable for their interests and ideologies,
expressed along nationalist, racialized, ethnicized, nativist, religious, patri-
archal or other lines, and to innovate practices of segregation, exclusion and
subordination. While these synergies of neoliberal and right-wing populism
are observed globally, they need to be carefully and differentially interpreted
from the perspective of late industrializing (or late welfare state) peripheral
countries. Nonetheless, common themes occurring across both centres and
peripheries, as identified by the invited contributions to this Debate sec-
tion, include exclusionary identity politics, hierarchical and subordinating
inclusions, and patriarchal familialism. In this context, segregationism is an
ominous possibility of post-neoliberal social policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Social policy has served as a powerful magnet for both political rage and
mobilization within the contemporary global context of rising right-wing
populist and authoritarian politics, from the US and the UK to India, Turkey,
Brazil and beyond. In the previous wave of erstwhile triumphant but now
apparently discredited neoliberalism, social policy was mostly vilified —
at least, in its more universalistic, welfare-state inspired manifestations.
Many have assumed that the page has turned with the rise of social pro-
tection agendas, epitomized by World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) engagement in these agendas, even though this has occurred
alongside renewed austerity and reform programmes pushed by these same
international financial institutions (IFIs) in the context of global slowdown
and debt overhang. In the meantime, the denigration of social assistance has
been increasingly taken up as a focus of right-wing loathing, perpetuating
rather than abandoning the neoliberal tropes of perverse work incentives and
welfare dependence, albeit with increasingly racialized and/or nationalistic
twists.
At the same time, however, social policies have also been used as political
strategies by various contemporary right-wing and authoritarianmovements,
especially but not only by the so-called populist right, whether in democratic
or non-democratic regimes. They have served as powerful vehicles for mo-
bilizing conservative and reactionary populist sentiments beyond critique
and towards political projects that construct and propagate nativist notions
of ‘community’ as well as ideologies and practices of social order based
on segregation, exclusion and subordination. This latter tendency has often
been overlooked or underemphasized in the battles against the austerity and
retrenchment that have been characteristic of neoliberalism. When it has
been recognized, it is often interpreted as a reaction to neoliberalism, per-
haps even the death of neoliberalism, insofar as one takes the liberalism of
neoliberalism seriously.
There are reasons to question this interpretation, in particular because
the segregating and exclusionary tendencies that are characteristic of the
new Right were already apparent in ‘neoliberal’ social policy. This begs
us to question the degree to which current right-wing populism, for in-
stance, is really a reaction to neoliberalism or rather an extension of its
more perverse but logical trajectories. Social policy is particularly perti-
nent to this question given its centrality within these contemporary political
permutations.
This Forum Debate seeks to extend critical scholarship in these direc-
tions by examining the confluence of neoliberal, populist, conservative and
reactionary influences on contemporary ideologies and practices of social
policy, with a focus on the poorer peripheries of global capitalism. So-
cial policy in this sense refers to the range of publicly or collectively pro-
vided, funded and/or regulated services and interventions that principally
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target social provisioning (as opposed to economic policies that have social
consequences, but that are not principally concerned with social provision-
ing). The conventional components are education, healthcare and social
protection. Social protection in turn refers to social assistance (i.e. ‘welfare’
or ‘non-contributory’ transfers), social security/insurance (i.e. ‘contributory’
transfers), and formal and/or informal standards and regulations, such as in
labour markets.1 Social policy is also conventionally considered to encom-
pass several related areas such as housing policy, child protection, family
planning and some aspects of care work, insofar as these also relate to the
function of providing for or influencing various social outcomes, such as
learning, health, or the access to and the incidence of adequate and secure
livelihoods and income.2
Within this broad understanding, social protection has received most of
the attention of late as a narrower view of social policy, whereas it is properly
understood as a subset of social policy. In particular, health and education
provisioning have huge implications for social stratification and the social
reproduction of inequality, and they touch a core nerve of social politics
because they structure the ways that various social groups might come into
contact with each other in moments of intimacy and vulnerability. Social
policies are in this sense fundamentally political given that they serve as the
basis for defining and instituting rights and entitlements, distributing public
goods, redistributing wealth, and articulating some of the main mechanisms
of integration and segregation within societies. For all of these reasons, a
holistic consideration of social policy is needed in order to assess its relation
to broader political dynamics.
With regard to the contemporary right-wing politics considered in this
Debate, there are fundamentally two issues at stake in relation to social
policy. The first is often framed in terms of a Polanyian double movement,
referring to the idea of Karl Polanyi (1944) that the creation and extension
of market society (or capitalism) elicits spontaneous responses from society
to control and tame the dislocations brought about through such extensions.
Many people have related this idea to the variety of social and political
responses that have emerged to address the ills of neoliberalism from the
1. On this conceptualization of social protection, which has become common in international
organizations, see an overview by Hujo and Gaia (2011).
2. For further discussion of this conceptualization of social policy, particularly as it pertains
to development, see Fischer (2012, 2018) or Martinez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea
(2016). For broader treatments, see Gough et al. (2004), Hall and Midgley (2004) and
Mkandawire (2004). Also note that in his definition of social policy, Mkandawire (2004: 1)
defines social policy according to its economic functions, mostly with reference to its social
protection functions, for example, interventions in the economy to influence livelihoods and
income. A broader conceptualization arguably should include the social functions of social
policy, such as the provisioning of schooling and healthcare to effect education and health
outcomes, regardless of whether these have an income effect.
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late 1970s onwards. Social policies have featured prominently as examples
of such responses, such as the global rise of the social protection agenda.
However, these recent social policy innovations have been discredited by
their association with a neoliberal policy framework that limits their trans-
formative potential to challenge the various intersecting forms of inequality
or social dislocation created or exacerbated by neoliberalism. This associa-
tion refers to the increasing adoption or co-option of rights and related social
agendas by neoliberal policy thinkers from the mid-1990s onwards — what
Porter and Craig (2004) call ‘inclusive neoliberalism’, Betz (2018) calls a
socially liberal variant of neoliberalism, Fraser (2017) and Kiely (2018, and
this issue) call ‘progressive neoliberalism’, and Fine and Saad Filho (2017)
and Putzel (this issue) call the ‘mature phase’ of neoliberalism. Because
many of these social policies have come to symbolize the broader neoliberal
project as some of its most tangible aspects for ordinary people, they have
also come to be the focus of much of the social anger generated by these
contradictions, particularly on issues of diversity, as highlighted by the work
of Streeck (2014, 2019).
The Right has notably been much more successful at capturing and chan-
nelling this anger than the Left, precisely because of this uneasy association
of the (New) Left with the neoliberal project. Examples of the latter include
the NewDemocrats in the US in the 1990s, New Labour in the UK in the late
1990s and 2000s, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT — the Workers’
Party) in Brazil in the 2000s (on the latter, see Braga and Barbosa dos Santos,
2019; Lavinas, 2017; Saad-Filho, 2015, 2019). Several of the contributions
to this Debate explore these contradictions, especially Kiely and Putzel,
but also Bug˘ra, Gudhavarthy and Vijay, Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, and
Riggirozzi. All of them contend to various degrees that many of the recent
innovations in social policy have served to soften or even further advance
neoliberal deepening, such as ‘reform’ agendas of retrenching formal social
security, deregulating labour markets, and privatizing education, healthcare
and pensions. Notably, this contention is not quite the same as the Polanyian
double movement argument. Instead, it questions the degree to which such
social policies have in fact been reactions to neoliberalism, versus just sly
repackaging.
The second issue at stake — which has received far less scrutiny — is
how social policy itself has been used as a political tool by right-wing and/or
authoritarian movements or governments spearheading or channelling these
reactions. This deals with the proactive and constructive uses of social policy
to fashion the social order along lines deemed amenable for their ideologies
— expressed along nationalist, racialized, ethnicized, nativist, religious,
patriarchal or other lines — or else to support their political strategies,
resources and interests. In other words, various elements of social policy are
used to bolster or cement support for such new-right, often religious political
movements, as well as to disseminate and/or reinforce certain ideological
narratives that suit these ends.
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These two interrelated issues are elaborated in the following four sections.
The first discusses how the latter proactive uses of social policy have been
largely overlooked by the social policy and development literatures, espe-
cially with respect to the dominant focus on the donor and allied scholarly
driven social protection agenda. The second explores the relation between
neoliberalism and such right-wing political movements through the lens of
social policy. The third further elaborates these relations in terms of how
they need to be carefully and differentially interpreted from the perspective
of the late industrializing (or late welfare state) peripheral countries. The
fourth returns to some of the main issues that are highlighted by the invited
contributions to this Debate section, namely exclusionary identity politics,
hierarchical and subordinating inclusions, and patriarchal familialism. The
conclusion reflects on the revival and normalization of segregationism that is
one of the ominous possibilities emerging from these social policy agendas
under neoliberalism and right-wing politics.
TURNING A CENTRIST BLIND EYE
The use of social policy as a political tool for conservative, reactionary
or regressive ends is not new. The conservative and authoritarian uses of
modern social policy have been evident since the 19th century, even under
ostensibly liberal political systems. The classic reference point is the Vic-
torian New Poor Law of 1834, which was used to discipline the English
poor with the threat of having to receive social assistance under extremely
punitive, almost penal terms.3 Indeed, the liberal credentials of the British
political system were belied by these practices of social assistance, at least
from the perspective of poorer working class people. Other more recent ex-
amples include the use of schooling and healthcare provisioning or housing
policy to enforce segregation in the US, whether explicitly during the John
Crow era, or implicitly up to the present (see Rothstein, 2015; Solomon
et al., 2019; Taylor, 2019). Nazism in Germany made very potent use of
social policy in mobilizing popular support and ordering social relations, as
explored in the 2019 edited book by Kott and Patel (see Burleigh, 1991);
this built on the conservative Bismarckian foundations that were also origi-
nally intended to counteract socialist movements among theworking classes.
Various social policies were deployed under various colonial regimes, for
organizing labour, enforcing segregation, or preventing unrest, among other
functions (e.g. Drinot, 2011; Ferguson, 2015; Milton, 2007). The use of
residential schools in Canada and Australia were similarly deployed as a
means of violent, racist incorporation of indigenous peoples and of cultural
genocide, with exclusionary outcomes despite assimilationist intents. Social
3. For an excellent overview of the contemporaneous debates leading up to this law, and those
that followed, see Block and Somers (2003).
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policy measures were used to institutionalize apartheid in South Africa —
particularly in relation to housing, education and employment regulations
— and similar measures have been used to enforce segregation and settle-
ments in Israel and Palestine. Hayekians might also wish to lump any social
democratic state intervention into private life as part of this mix, given their
view that such interventions ultimately lead to totalitarianism, and scholars
of Foucauldian governmentality might also agree that such interventions
share a similar aim of social engineering and control. However, the key
distinction is that the intention of social democratic state interventions is
to overcome segregation and exclusions, whereas the illiberal right-wing
approaches mentioned above intentionally and explicitly seek to engineer
them instead.
Against this backdrop, the naı¨vete´ of most of the current scholarship on
social policy in developing countries is striking. The dominant focus on
social protection — cash transfers in particular — is mostly blind to such
aspects of social ordering, disciplining and control, although with some
important exceptions (as discussed below). A strong case can be made that
this blindness is partly due to the co-opting of so much of the scholarship by
bilateral and multilateral donor funding and agendas, as argued by Adesina
(2011, and this issue) and by Peck and Theodore (2015). Whether due
to vested interests or simply ideational conditioning, these agendas have
advanced narrow residualist visions of social policy while at the same time
being complicit — whether consciously or inadvertently — in neoliberal
policy agendas more generally, as noted above. However, the blindness
arguably also stems from a particular predicament faced by political and
scholarly centres in the current context of rising right-wing politics. The
squeeze from the Right has prompted a defensiveness from these centres
towards critiques from the Left regarding whatever erstwhile incremental
gains might have been made by centrist initiatives. This especially applies to
social policy, where centrist or New Left political parties see their legacies
as having been the most progressive, hence vindicating other deficiencies.
An alternative, more sophisticated argument for strategic blindness is
that conservative approaches to social policy have nonetheless sometimes
resulted in progressive evolutions (although often they have not). The clas-
sic case is the conservative Bismarckian regime in Germany, as mentioned
above. Another, as often noted by Mkandawire (e.g. 2005: 7, citing Green-
Pedersen 2003), is the example of movements towards universalistic social
policies in Denmark initiated by right-wing rather than left-wing govern-
ments. These examples are sometimes evoked to justify a strategic tolerance
towards more residualist initiatives, given that even very marginal steps
might be catalysts for something greater (insofar as you can pick winners,
to echo industrial policy debates).
The problem with such incremental gradualism is that conservative
approaches have more often simply led to deeply entrenched dualisms
that are subsequently very difficult to transform, as in most developing
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countries. The classic cases in this sense are the Southern Cone countries
in Latin America where, as noted by Barrientos (2004), the share of the
labour force covered by social insurance schemes reached over 70 per cent
by the end of the 1970s (in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina). Yet the
trend towards universalism in social insurance was abruptly aborted there-
after, while health and education systems remained deeply stratified. In this
context, the Northern European cases might be exceptions, products of par-
ticular historical conjunctures that are not applicable today or to developing
countries. These European conjunctures were also violent on a massive in-
dustrial scale. As argued by Kott and Patel (2019: 24–25), it was only the
extremities of Nazism during the first half of the 1940s that pushed liberal
democracies to move away from the eugenic, racist and imperialist tenden-
cies and legacies that were evident within their own social policies up to
World War II. However, this is hardly a desirable roadmap for the present,
especially given that the eugenic, racist and imperialist tendencies were not
eradicated by the post-war settlement but only suppressed, and are now
resurfacing.
Regardless, there is a tendency within the policy and allied academic
scholarship to view any expansion or extension of social policies and pro-
grammes as progressive advances, to the extent of framing gains as revo-
lutionary, to be guarded and promoted even at the cost of critical enquiry.
In the process, a wide variety of programmes often get lumped together.
Hanlon et al. (2010), for instance, package together a very broad range of
social protection programmes, from more employment-centred job creation
or guarantee schemes, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme in India or the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, to
much more conservative, narrowly targeted and minimalist cash transfer
programmes, with or without conditions, such as those that have prolifer-
ated across Latin America, Africa and Asia over the last two decades. Even
more critical scholars such as Ferguson (2015) have characterized the latter
residualist cash transfer programmes as representing some new form of dis-
tributive (or perhaps he means redistributive) politics, despite the fact that
they clearly are not (from the perspective of social policy scholarship, which
he mostly ignores),4 nor are they necessarily at odds with neoliberalism.5
Indeed, Adesina (this issue) argues that many of these programmes rep-
resent policy merchandizing that utilizes an instrumentality of clientelism
within an imperial deployment of power that is in fact deeply subversive to
the consolidation of democracy in African states. The subversion is due in
part to the short-circuiting of state–citizen channels of accountability and
of broad cross-class or cross-group coalitions that usually serve as the basis
4. For instance, Ferguson (2015) ignores the seminal works of Mkandawire (2001, 2005), as
well as Adesina (2011) and other critical voices.
5. For a discussion of how these programmes are in fact quite aligned with neoliberalism, see
Fischer (2010, 2018).
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for more progressive evolutions within local political economies, and which
donors seem determined to avoid for fear of imagined neo-patrimonialist
machinations.
Yet, the fact that these programmes are celebrated as revolutionary or
at least progressive evolutions, despite their diversity in modalities and
political origins, gives reason for a critical pause. A small but growing
critical scholarship on social policy in developing countries has taken up the
task, pointing to the political aspects of such social protection programmes as
technologies of statecraft, social control and ordering, and of reproducing and
structuring inequalities rather than necessarily attenuating them, especially in
health and education.6 The point is that social policy is inherently political as
it fundamentally deals with the articulation and actualization of social norms
and entitlements, and with social ordering, legibility and discipline, and it
has different effects when deployed by groups with different agendas. In this
sense, it is used by both the Left and the Right for these functions, although
of course it is used differently, with different objectives, and guided by
different ideological visions about moral social order. Yet these ideological
and political economy aspects of social policy are mostly ignored in the
self-celebratory social protection niche literature.
Again, the often-exaggerated euphoria or even evangelizing about these
programmes by their proponents might be partly understood as a desire to
solidify small marginal gains against ever-belligerent pressures to erode so-
cial policy systems, particularly against concerns of austerity. Hence, in the
face of these struggles, there is a tendency to perhaps overemphasize the
success of small wins while turning a blind eye towards some of the dark
sides that come with these wins, or other regressive developments on com-
plementary fronts. We might think, for example, of celebrated expansions
of minimalist and narrowly targeted cash transfer programmes, pursued as
part of broader agendas of pushing for much larger ‘reforms’ in social secu-
rity systems or privatization in education or health systems, as consistently
promoted by the World Bank, the IMF and other IFIs — even if by stealth
under the banner of so-called ‘universal coverage’.7 Indeed, despite recent
public relations attempts to signal support for universal social protection by
both the IMF and the World Bank,8 these reform agendas were reiterated in
6. See for example: Blofield and Martinez Franzoni (2015); Cookson (2018); Fine (2014);
Jensen and Tyler (2015); Jones (2016); Kidd andAthias (2019); Lavinas (2013, 2017, 2018);
Molyneux (2008);Molyneux et al. (2016); Palacio Luden˜a (2019); Saad-Filho (2015); Schild
(2007); Wacquant (2009).
7. See Klees et al. (2019) on the World Bank’s position on education, as expressed in the 2018
World Development Report. Also see Clegg (Assessment, this issue) on the IMF’s position
on social protection and Meagher (Assessment, this issue) on the 2019 World Development
Report.
8. IMF (2019: 11) specifies that ‘consultations were held with various groups to discuss the
scope of the paper, including . . . CSOs, trade unions and academics’. As a participant in two
of these ‘consultations’ (the ITUC and LSE conferences in 2018), I am able to attest to the
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the World Bank White Paper by Packard et al. (2019). Baunach et al. (2019)
clarify that this White Paper proposes that coverage in social protection
systems should be extended by rolling back existing rights and protections
for workers, in terms of both social security and labour market protections,
including increasing labour market flexibility, limiting minimum wage in-
creases, reducing employers’ responsibilities for financing social security,
and increasing regressive forms of taxation such as value added tax. It is per-
haps no coincidence that such measures have been taken up by the far-right
government of Bolsonaro in Brazil, for instance, whose attacks on social
and political liberalism are often excused in the financial press for producing
‘major policy achievements’ (Stott, 2019) of public sector pension reform,
as long sought by IFIs.9
Interestingly, these neoliberal reform agendas are usually cast in pro-
gressive, even emancipatory terms, which is where they find affinity with
right-wing populism. For instance, formal social security systems are pre-
sented as elitist, exclusionary, inegalitarian and patriarchal.10 The fact that
they often do match these qualifications provides some empirical legitimacy
to IFI reform agendas. Buğra (this issue) and Gudavarthy and Vijay (this is-
sue) discuss precisely this point in the cases of Turkey and India, in terms of
how the right-wing governments of Erdogan and Modi cultivate discourses
characterizing formal social security regimes as part of an elitist, secular
and authoritarian legacy, as opposed to notions of populist governance that
nonetheless continue to advance neoliberal agendas.
The risk is that such logics are used to justify reducing standards of public
social provisioning down to their lowest common denominator, whilst not
addressing the fundamental sources of social stratification and segregation
that drive exclusionary forms of development in the first place. Moreover,
they can be seen as having continued to reproduce social differentiation
on increasingly neoliberal logics. Viewed through this lens of social policy,
right-wing populism can be understood as not contradictory to neoliberalism,
but in many ways advancing it.
warming of both the IMF and World Bank representatives to a discourse of universal social
protection, although questions still remained about how ‘universal’ was to be interpreted.
IMF (2019) is typically evasive on such matters, in terms of providing any substantive
policy specifications. However, its position as described above has become very apparent
in subsequent country programmes, such as in Ecuador, Argentina, Nigeria, etc.
9. In The Financial Times, Stott (2019) forgives Bolsonaro’s attacks on social and political
liberalism, given that ‘[he] finally produced major policy achievements’, winning ‘decisive
backing from the lower house of the National Congress for a plan to rein in the cost of
Brazil’s unaffordable public sector pensions’.
10. See, for example, Levy (2008); from the more critical camp, Molyneux (2006) argues that
social provisioning in Latin America during Cepalismo maintained gendered conceptions
of social needs along familial, patriarchal and paternalist lines.
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NEOLIBERALISM REDUX
These affinities between neoliberalism and right-wing populismhighlight the
challenges of defining neoliberalism, broadly understood as the intervention-
ist and utopic political project of instituting laissez-faire or self-regulating
capitalism. Several authors in this Debate have taken up the task, in partic-
ular Kiely, whose contribution focuses almost entirely on this point, as well
as Putzel, who ties it more explicitly to the theme of social policy. Kiely,
citing Davies (2014), Mirowski (2013) and himself (Kiely, 2018), stresses
that neoliberalism needs to be understood precisely in terms of its interven-
tionist logic, as a project designed to extend the market to all spheres of
society. He refers to this as ‘the neoliberal paradox’ (Kiely, 2018), in the
sense that neoliberalism actually deploys and extends much of the state’s
Weberian bureaucratic rationalization for this purpose, despite its anti-statist
ideology. This incoherence allows for the constant renewal of the interven-
tionist project. In this respect, his argument echoes the iconic phrase of Karl
Polanyi (1944), whom he cites and discusses, that laissez-faire is planned,
whereas planning is not.
Indeed, one might add that this incoherence often trips up critical develop-
ment studies, especially the more post-structuralist variants. A fundamental
problem with much of the post-development critique is that, in their reac-
tion to the oppressiveness of state projects of development, scholars often
carry an implicit anti-statist bias, to the extent of rejecting state-led redis-
tributive projects given their inevitable elements of social engineering. In
the confused blurring between statist development strategies and neoliberal
strategies that claim to advance development (even if they often do not),
this critical anti-statism from the Left can inadvertently feed into the neolib-
eral agenda. Kiely (this issue) even notes that it can feed into right-wing
populism, given the common distrust of the expert, which both share with
neoliberal theories of knowledge. Putzel (this issue) also discusses this point
with regard to the vilification of the state and the rejection of scientific
expertise. The ingrained problem is that the rejection of statism does not
necessarily guide us in emancipatory directions. As Barbara Harriss-White
(2002) argues, while state regulation might be imperfect, the alternative is
never non-regulation, but regulation through other, usually more regressive
social structures. Anti-statism in this sense distracts from the crucial under-
standing of states as sites of social struggle and conflict, which needs to be
embraced in order for progressive agendas and political movements to have
any traction.
Moreover, the confusion that right-wing populism might represent the
death of neoliberalism is arguably based on overlooking reactionary
elements within neoliberalism itself. Reactionary in this sense refers to a
fundamental orientation of seeking to maintain and bolster the position and
power of the traditional ruling classes, as argued by Kari Polanyi Levitt
with respect to fascism in the 1930s (Fischer and Polanyi Levitt, 2019). The
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neoliberal project aligns with this through its own fundamental orientation
towards the protection of private property rights (and their free creation
and use, particularly financial assets), which belies its reactionary nature
in a world where most wealth and power is inherited rather than earned.
The neoliberal ideology obscures this nature through a radical discourse of
freedom, and yet its conservative impulse to preserve the prevailing social
order sets it in stark contrast to classical liberalism, which was much more
revolutionary in seeking to undo the old aristocratic social order. In this
respect, neoliberalism is not necessarily in tension with illiberal right-wing
populism despite its advocacy of political liberalism, given that both contain
this similar reactionary impulse. The fact that right-wing populism seeks to
substitute a revolutionary solidarity of class with a conservative solidarity
of nation or racial group — similar to classic fascism, as noted by Polanyi
Levitt (ibid.) — serves the neoliberal project well in terms of undermining
collective class mobilizations that might challenge the power of capital.
This conservative or even reactionary impulse is poignantly expressed in
neoliberal approaches to social policy. These are generally oriented towards
disciplining (or at best incentivizing) the behaviour of poor people through
segregated (and poor quality) systems of provisioning, often done in puni-
tive ways that are almost Victorian in nature. This is regularly presented as
promoting the rights of the poor, which is a common confusion of rhetoric
for reality in the literature. At the (unfortunately common) extreme, these
approaches morph into a form of neo-eugenics, as often observed in some of
the more egregious uses and abuses of randomized control trials (RCTs).11
The use of behavioural nudges in particular appeals to a conservative im-
pulse that prefers disciplining poor people rather than redistributing wealth
and power towards them. The idea that more (impact) can be made with
less (spending) is ideally adapted to agendas of everlasting austerity. It also
appeals to what is considered in Foucauldian terms as a form of neoliberal
governmentality, referring to technologies of power for governing popu-
lations through discourses and norms of self-regulation or self-discipline,
with the aim of making oneself entrepreneurial and fit to engage in markets.
While such interventionist and segregationist impulses are not particularly
liberal — at least not the post-war social democratic version of liberalism
expounded by Amartya Sen among others — they fit comfortably with the
11. Indeed, Hoffman (2018) shows that many of these studies — including those by Banerjee,
Duflo and Kremer, the winners of the 2019 Swedish Central Bank Prize in Economics
in Honour of Alfred Noble — contain strong anti-union and labour casualization biases,
while also exhibiting an anti-empirical stance towards the longer-term implications of
policies informed by these biases. This notably ties them quite decidedly into neoliberal
agendas despite their pretence of being ideology- and even theory-free. In a subsequent
survey of RCTs, Hoffman (2019) makes a compelling argument that the common disregard
for informed consent in these social experiments on poor and vulnerable people not only
increases risks of unintended harm but also establishes continuities with colonial social
experimentation. Also see Muller et al. (2019).
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similarly segregationist impulse of illiberal right-wing populism. While the
latter targets its discipline at racial or other groups rather than at generic
categories of poor people, the fact that poverty is often racialized allows for
a smooth transition between these two conceptual targets.
In a similar sense, there is not necessarily a contradiction, as is often as-
sumed, between neoliberalism on the one hand and the rise of modern and
political forms of religious conservatism or fundamentalism on the other, as
observed in the US, Latin America, Turkey, India and elsewhere. Indeed,
religious or spiritual notions of self-discipline can easily code-switch and
transmute into a logic of neoliberal governmentality, as noted for instance
with respect to contemporary practices of yoga (Godrej, 2017) and mindful-
ness meditation (Cohen, 2017; Forbes, 2017; Purser, 2019). Buğra (2015)
similarly points out that a conservative ethic is manifest in Friedrich Hayek’s
conception of economic liberalism, which he argued must be underpinned
with strong moral order. His vision was not one of complete libertarianism,
but rather of strong systems of moral conduct necessary to provide the social
and institutional mooring for free markets to function effectively in the con-
text of minimalist states. Kiely (this issue) highlights a similar point, citing
the work of Melinda Cooper (2017), who demonstrates through the history
of the poor laws in the US that the liberal ethos was always underpinned
by the imperative of family and kinship obligations, which carries through
to the present in the relationship between neoliberals and social conserva-
tives. Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton (this issue) give more precise examples
in the cases of Croatia, Hungary and Poland, in terms of how social policy
has been an ‘important arena of struggle for a hegemonic moral economy,
a shifting domain where radical restructurings of social provisioning and
social ordering take place’, which is ‘not entirely understandable in terms
of the concept of “neoliberalism”, but impossible to understand without it’.
Gudavarthy and Vijay (this issue) argue in the case of India that the new
imagination of populist governance rooted inmajoritarianHindu nationalism
has served to advance economic agendas of neoliberalism. The emergence of
neo-Confucianism in China, as noted by Duckett (this issue), could be seen
as offering a similar function of asserting an elitist and conservative concep-
tion of moral order that nonetheless holds popular appeal, thereby serving
to buttress what Duckett calls ‘neoliberal-looking’ economic policies.
The irony recognized across all of the Debate contributions is that, as
noted above, despite these associations between neoliberalism and right-
wing populism, the latter has been much more successful than the Left at
capturing social and political reactions against neoliberalism (with some
exceptions). In this regard, Keily and Bug ̆ra both evoke the Polanyian con-
cept of double movement. As mentioned earlier, this refers to the work of
Karl Polanyi (1944), who theorized that the creation of market society (or
capitalism) involved dialectical processes: on one hand, self-regulating mar-
kets are extended by states in a planned manner, while on the other hand,
societies respond in spontaneous ways to control and tame the dislocations
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brought about through such extensions, or what Putzel (2002) refers to as
the ‘impulse for social protection’ (not referring to the meaning of social
protection that has come to be used in social policy scholarship). A more
liberal scholarship has come to interpret this as a pendular movement of
history (e.g. Stewart, 2009; see a good survey of this in Goodwin, 2018).
However, more Marxian readings emphasize a particular identification of
systemic crisis within capitalism, albeit one that locates the breaking points
as first occurring within the social and political contradictions of capitalism,
rather than in the economic contradictions as per conventional Marxism.
Nor did Polanyi necessarily think that the double movement could redeem
capitalism, insofar as attempts to re-embed market society would be invari-
ably unstable and crisis-prone, especially if, in the process, society remains
commodified.12
Related to this, another key point that distinguishes Polanyi from conven-
tional Marxism is his emphasis that there is no particular class or ideological
bias in the ensuing social reactions. In other words, the social protection
impulse can take on revolutionary, reformist, as well as conservative or re-
actionarymanifestations. Kiely (this issue) intimates this point by suggesting
that rising right-wing populism might well be a Polanyian moment, but one
directed towards social conservatism. Indeed, this is one problem with the
thesis of Nancy Fraser (2013): she attributes the inability of progressive
social movements to mount a coherent countermovement to neoliberalism
to a lack of Polanyian political logic, even whilst rising right-wing populist
movements in many parts of the world have been precisely confirming this
political logic — just not in ways that progressives would prefer.
As a case in point, Karl Polanyi used his optic to understand the emergence
of fascism, socialism and the New Deal in the 1930s (a point that Fraser
alludes to, but then does not carry through to the rest of her article, perhaps
given her emancipatory intent). Similar to Hannah Arendt (1951), Polanyi
pointed out that support for Nazism often came from lower-middle and
middle classes in the smaller cities and towns of Germany, emphasizing
again the broader cross-class character of the impulse and the fact that
dislocations are felt across social hierarchies, in different ways but with
politically important congealing effects.13 As noted above, to the extent that
such movements express nativist and racist but nonetheless strong ideas of
moral order, or imagined revivals of moral order, they could be seen as
impulses for controlling the dislocating effects of neoliberalism, even whilst
enforcing notions of social order as a functional basis for further extending
or deepening neoliberalism.
12. For this understanding of Polanyi’s work and its associated debates, I am indebted to
numerous conversations on the topic with his daughter, Kari Polanyi Levitt, as well as my
participation in many Polanyi conferences.
13. See Fischer (2007, 2008b) for an application of this optic in relation to minority relations in
Western China.
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These reflections are important precisely because, while the rise of right-
wing populism and various forms of authoritarianism might well be under-
stood as double movements in response to neoliberal reforms, they are not
necessarily in antipathy with neoliberalism. It is precisely this contradiction
that provides them with their especially virulent nature, particularly as the
conservative ideological impulse implicit or explicit within both neoliberal-
ism and new-right reactions carries the propensity to become increasingly
disciplinary and punitive. The continuous refinements of targeting devices
in the realm of social protection, for instance, carry this propensity, as does
the deployment of behavioural research on poor people, as noted above.
The irony is that many of these targeting systems were developed by
erstwhile ‘New Left’ governments, such as in the US, the UK and Latin
America. Putzel (this issue) discusses this point at length with regard to
the ‘mature’ phase of neoliberalism from the mid-1990s onwards, based on
the increasing use of targeted programmes that have not contradicted the
market-orientation of neoliberal strategies. Riggirozzi (this issue) implies
this point in highlighting the potential for the earlier targeted and precari-
ously funded schemes introduced during the Latin American ‘Pink Tide’ to
undermine legitimacy and inclusive democracy. Gudavarthy and Vijay (this
issue) similarly note that a reversion to targeted programmes under Modi
in India has served the double purpose of rejecting the ideas of universal
social security that had gained currency under the previous regime — at
least rhetorically, given that targeting remained the dominant mode of social
assistance under that regime — while at the same time appealing to the idea
of weeding-out outsiders deemed non-deserving of such targeted assistance.
These arguments also clarify why social policy is often singled out by the
socio-political reactions to neoliberalism, which have not necessarily been
directed towards neoliberal economic policy per se but towards the liberal
social and cultural policies with which it has been associated. This propen-
sity is particularly emphasized by Putzel (this issue), in terms of how social
policy has served as one of the primary symbols of the contradictions of this
form of ‘inclusive neoliberalism’ (Porter and Craig, 2004). These symbols
are based on recognition of the rights of women, minorities, migrants and
the poor (or of ‘diversity’), but in the absence of strong redistributive or
labour-protecting policies, and in the presence of austerity in public provi-
sioning. From these contradictions, the conservative populist reaction has
been directed at these symbols of social liberalism, thereby reinforcing the
scapegoating of particular groups or individuals, and making popular resent-
ments susceptible to racist and misogynist messages of right-wing populists.
For instance, arguments have been made during healthcare reform debates in
the US that the private insurance system has not been working well because
of abuse of the system by illegal migrants, not because of any deficiency with
themodel per se. Similarly, arguments have beenmade that the erosion of the
welfare state in Scandinavia is the result of a breakdown of homogeneity due
to migration, thereby undermining the foundation of social solidarity that
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is essential to the model. Such narratives and the increasingly exclusionary
practices of social policy that have accompanied these narratives — or what
Putzel (this issue) calls ‘discourses and authoritarian practices of social ex-
clusion’— thereby serve as distractions from ongoing intensification of neo-
liberal economic policy, such as trade and investment liberalization, labour
market deregulation, fiscal austerity and the marketization of the state.
INVERSIONS ON THE PERIPHERIES
In her discussion of the Turkish case, Buğra (this issue) also offers a crucial
twist that is fundamental to understanding how the relationship between
neoliberalism and rising right-wing populism needs to be interpreted dif-
ferently in peripheral, late industrializing settings, as opposed to how it
has acted out in the centres of global capitalism. She emphasizes how the
development of social policy in late industrializing countries followed an
inverse process compared to the industrial centres. In the latter, the expan-
sion of social assistance was a precursor to formal social security regimes
in 19th century Europe, as epitomized by the poor laws of England, which
preceded the development of modern social security systems. Of course,
some might argue that these poor laws were so punitive and even penal
that they are barely worth considering as equivalent to modern social as-
sistance. Nonetheless, following Buğra’s argument, formal (contributory)
social security systems in late industrializing countries came first, before
the systematic state-led adoptions of (‘non-contributory’) social assistance
targeted at the poor and/or informal. While social assistance programmes
have had a long history in many developing countries, they have tended to
be fragmented, piecemeal, underfunded and not prioritized by states. The
more systemic expansion of social assistance that has been characteristic of
the ‘New Poverty Agenda’ of the 1990s (e.g. Lipton et al., 1992) and then
the social protection agenda from the 2000s onwards has therefore taken
place within a polarized context, against a wall of already well-developed
and formalized social security institutions.14
This simple but profound insight is important because it points to a funda-
mentally different development dynamic in these peripheries than what
might be inferred from an interpretative lens that draws from the history
of the industrial centres. In this, it has much in common with the Latin
American structuralist tradition, particularly the work of Celso Furtado, who
noted a similar inversion in processes of industrialization.15 In this sense,
care must be taken in interpreting right-wing support for various aspects of
14. Barrientos (2019) also makes this point with respect to the Bismarckian social insurance
model in Latin America.
15. See Furtado (1983). For a discussion that places this more broadly within structuralist
approaches to development economics, see Fischer (2015).
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social assistance in developing countries, given that its political logic likely
differs considerably from how similar dynamics occur in European welfare
states that tend to dominate our thinking on such issues. The recent expan-
sions of social assistance in developing countries, for instance, often play
a role in broader multipronged strategies of reforming (retrenching) formal
social security systems or more broad-based subsidy programmes (as con-
tinuously lobbied by the IMF, as noted above), within contexts where labour
markets are already very flexible (informal employment is by definition al-
ready unregulated, at least with respect to formal public forms of regulation).
Moreover, this ties in with right-wing critiques of labour aristocracies, or the
idea that social security coverage is highly unequal, covering only a minority
of workers in most developing countries, and that any minimalist expansion
of social assistance therefore represents a net progressive gain. In contrast,
neoliberal reform agendas in the North focus on the fact that wide sections
of the population have access to relatively generous social security and as-
sistance, which presents a major obstacle to deregulating labour markets.
The euphoria over the extension of quite narrowly targeted social protection
in developing countries is therefore informed by an important misinterpre-
tation, as if the advance of social assistance in the South is somehow the
antithesis of attempts to restrict it in the North.
Instead, the synergy between social policy expansion and ‘illiberal pol-
itics’ in many parts of the world needs to be understood from this inverse
perspective of what might be called late welfare state development. For in-
stance, Bug ̆ra (this issue) argues that this new form of ‘illiberal politics’ in
Turkey has been based on a strategy of polarization that derives its relevance
from the contrast between the non-egalitarian and exclusionary character of
the country’s former social security system, versus the inclusionary elements
in the instruments and policies introduced by the AKP government. In this
manner, the foundational principle of secularism has been attacked as au-
thoritarian and as hostile to popular Islamic values and sentiment, thereby
undermining the criticisms by labour unions, professional associations and
women’s organizations — all associated as part of this secular, elitist and
authoritarian legacy— of the creeping marketization and privatization in the
health and pension systems pursued by the AKP government. This strategy
of polarization reverses the attack by stoking hostility among the disadvan-
taged masses against labour organizations, portraying them as defenders of
the privileged labour aristocracy. In contrast, the expansion of social as-
sistance has been marked by references to Islamic culture and framed as
charity. This legitimizes the many different types of irregular, discretionary
and in-kind assistance provided to the poor by public institutions, while
delegitimizing the critical voices calling for proper rights-based schemes, as
advocated by many on the Left.
Similarly, Gudavarthy and Vijay (this issue) emphasize how the Right
in India cultivated a political narrative that attacked the secular institutions
of development planning and policy as elitist, while combining this with
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market-oriented reforms. Secularism — portrayed as socially liberal by this
Right—has been contrastedwith a new imagination of an anti-establishment
populist governance that appeals to the popular demands generated in the
course of political mobilization. The subsumption of social policy into this
narrative, as one of its principal symbols and fields of engagement, has
thereby reinforced the pursuit of what Gudavarthy and Vijay refer to as an
‘exclusivist-authoritarian right-wing agenda’, or what might be referred to
as an illiberal form of hierarchical inclusion, in contrast to the (neo)liberal
imaginaries of social inclusion, as discussed further below.
The fact that these extensions of social assistance do not necessarily lead to
universalistic trajectories— as often hoped for— is taken up by Ramos (this
issue) and Duckett (this issue). In her discussion of the Philippines, Ramos
notes how the social policy expansion under President Duterte, which at best
could be considered a very narrow form of ‘universalism’ (defined mostly
in terms of coverage, regardless of modalities),16 has been deployed to in-
stitutionally entrench the already-existing deep segmentation of social pro-
visioning. The expansion has nonetheless proved functional and appealing
across the political spectrum and has been used to legitimize a conserva-
tive and authoritarian political order, thereby subverting the potential for
transformative social change.
In her discussion of China, Duckett provides a similarly sobering view
on social policy changes in that country, which also have been often cele-
brated as part of a Southern revolutionary long march towards universalism.
These social policy developments, which include new social old-age, health
and unemployment insurances, guarantees of nine years of free public edu-
cation, and means-tested income support for the poorest households, have
extended entitlements to hitherto excluded sections of the population and
somewhat eroded long-standing urban–rural divides. However, they have
been introduced in an underfunded manner, delivering only meagre support,
and parallel to rather than widening participation in existing and much more
generous social programmes, as enjoyed by the urban elites, middle classes
and formal sector workers. As a result, they have reinforced segmented pro-
visioning and, Duckett argues, are regressive overall, doing little to reduce
income inequalities. She clarifies the political logic of these social policy
expansions as facilitating economic marketization and privatization through
attempts to prevent public dissatisfaction, which the Chinese Communist
Party has managed through authoritarian controls over media, civil society
and union activity. These have enabled the Party-state to claim universal
coverage and policy progressivity while limiting demands for greater redis-
tribution. Duckett asserts a notion that these policy developments emerge
from the ‘neoliberal-looking’ character of policies in China, which have
prioritized marketization and privatization over a revival of universalistic
16. On this understanding of universalism, see Fischer (2012, 2018) and Martinez Franzoni and
Sanchez-Ancochea (2016).
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social rights following the collapse of the more rudimentary universalism of
Maoist social policy in the early reform era.
EXCLUSIONARY IDENTITY POLITICS, HIERARCHICAL INCLUSIONS
AND PATRIARCHAL FAMILIALISM
Several other common themes stand out strongly in the invited contributions
of thisDebate section. Prominent among these is the emergence of exclusion-
ary identity politics, as discussed by most of the authors. Kiely emphasizes
this point with respect to nativism and racism, especially in the European
and North American contexts. In speaking for a symbolic ‘people’, right-
wing populism has tended to dehumanize those considered ‘non-peoples’,
thereby excluding them from the democratic calculus of representation. In
the European and North American contexts, these strategies mostly tar-
get immigration and multiculturalism, and stoke the idea that liberal elites
have betrayed the imagined ‘native populations’, which notably draws from
fascist playbooks of the 1930s. More specifically addressing the cases of
Croatia, Hungary and Poland, Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton describe how
different combinations of authoritarianism, neoliberalism and conservatism
have come to hold hegemonic positions with the states of each country.
Social policy has crucially been expanded for so-called ‘deserving’ citizens
or ‘loyal’ interest groups, such as the ‘good Croats’, ‘good Hungarians’ or
‘good Poles’, while being radically retrenched for others judged as ‘unde-
serving’, often in combination with punitive discipline. As a result, Stubbs
and Lendvai-Bainton argue that this is ‘delivering a radical new vision of
social reproduction and fundamental differentiations in terms of access to
social citizenship . . . occurring across complex intersectionalities of class,
gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, disability, geographical location
and, crucially, political affiliation and loyalty’. In this particular central or
eastern European context, the hegemonic restructuring ‘rests, in particular,
on the issues of gender politics and anti-discrimination, seen as “alien” Eu-
ropean Union-inspired programmes imposed on nation states against the will
of their citizens and politicians’.
Related to this, another common theme is hierarchical or subordinated
forms of inclusion, as already emphasized above with respect to how the
expansion of social protection must be conceived differently in late develop-
ing contexts. The important point here is in the ways that the exclusions, as
mentioned in the previous point, form the basis for subordinated or adverse
forms of inclusion.17 This theme is picked up especially by Gudavarthy and
17. See Fischer (2007, 2008a, 2011, 2018) for detailed discussions on such symbioses between
exclusion and inclusion, especially under neoliberalism. Also, see du Toit (2004) on what
he calls ‘adverse incorporation’ and Hickey and du Toit (2007) on what they reframe as
‘adverse incorporation and social exclusion’.
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Vijay, who discuss how caste structure is approached and reframed by the
current regime in India as representing skill sets and occupational groups
rather than as a hierarchical, discriminatory, exclusionary and humiliating
institution. This is combined with a shift in emphasis from rights-based enti-
tlements to community-based empowerment, the latter providing a template
to reinforce ‘traditional’ social hierarchies (e.g. of caste, gender, etc.). The
social policy interventions that enact such conceptions are thereby presented
as pragmatic approaches of hierarchical inclusion, supporting the develop-
ment of occupation-related skills among caste groups associated with these
occupations, in contrast to the ineffective promises of transformation in
class, caste and gender relations that had been made by the previous regime
in a context of highly uneven economic opportunities.
A third common theme is related to gender politics and relations, as al-
ready mentioned several times. This specifically refers to the rise and/or
reassertion of patriarchal ideologies and practices of familialism (or neo-
familialism), and the deployment of various social policies to powerfully re-
shape gender relations along these lines. Several of the case studies present
this as part of the multipronged attack on liberal elitism. Indeed, Stubbs
and Lendvai-Bainton (this issue) relate this to how a renewed heteronorma-
tive familialism, ‘repatriarchalization’ and religious revival in contemporary
Croatia, Hungary and Poland have played key roles in the authoritarian and
neoliberal government projects of producing targeted and systematic divi-
sions, insecurity and abandonment. The reactive aspects of this opposition
to so-called ‘gender ideology’ take the form of protests against the Istanbul
Convention on domestic violence, an aggressive reassertion of heteronor-
mativity, and attempts to restrict abortion. The more constructive aspects
rest on complex sets of policies that are framed in terms of seeing women
as primarily wives and mothers, even while allowing for their subordinated
participation in labour markets.
Moreover, Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton argue that the responsibility of
national and ethnicized demographic renewal is placed heavily on women.
This connects these gender politics with anti-immigrant sentiments — or
what Putzel (this issue) refers to as the legitimation of misogynist and racist
discourse — as well as with ‘welfare chauvinism’ and a growing role for
church-based forces in social policy. It might be pointed out that this empha-
sis on ‘demographic renewal’ entails some degree of cognitive dissonance
given the fact that fertility rates in these countries are some of the lowest
in the world. For instance, according to current UN estimates (UN, 2019),
the total fertility rate in the 2015–20 period was 1.45 for Croatia, 1.49 for
Hungary, and 1.42 for Poland. Some sort of deep social contradiction within
these ideological politics is therefore bound to emerge, particularly given
that the high rates of emigration from these countries further undermine the
ability of familialist social policies to engender (pun intended) a nativist
demographic renewal. Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton implicitly acknowledge
this point in arguing that the renewed ‘radical repatriarchalization forms
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part of an authoritarian neoliberal response to a wider crisis of social repro-
duction, connecting nationalism, patriarchy, the heteronormative family and
religion’.
Bug˘ra (this issue) also analyses very similar themes in the case of Turkey,
as alreadymentioned above in terms of the polarizing discourses used against
women’s organizations. Within these discourses, there is a strong empha-
sis on women’s ‘natural’ difference as the basis of gender roles in Islamic
culture. This is then actualized through familialistic social policies that seek
to confine women to a position of care providers. Bug˘ra refers to this as
‘state-supported familialism’, which is different from the old familialism
that involved a more passive, neglectful role of the secular state in tradi-
tional family relations. In the newer familialism, state policies have actively
subsidized women’s domestic social care roles through ‘different types of
family support policies [that] have now become important in the expanded
realm of social assistance’ (citing Akkan, 2018), such as transfers made
to poor families for the care-at-home of the disabled, elderly and children,
with women ‘naturally’ appearing as care providers. Such approaches can
be seen as means to deal with the crisis in social reproduction that neolib-
eralism has exacerbated. At the same time, they limit the commodification
of female labour and contributing to the exclusion of women from working
life, in conformity with the conservative outlook of the AKP, by subsidizing
women’s position in the gender division of roles within traditional family
relations.
CONCLUSION: OMINOUS POTENTIAL FUTURES OF SOCIAL POLICY
As an ominous concluding note to this Debate section Introduction,18 the
revival of segregationism is one of the pervasive issues emerging within the
convergence of existing social policy agendas and practices under neoliberal-
ism and the rise of right-wing politics. Many of the Debate articles shed light
on this, whether explicitly or implicitly. Segregationism refers to the intellec-
tual and policy proclivity to single out and segregate groups of people defined
according to poverty, race, ethnicity, religion, gender or other social markers
from the rest of society as the objects of public (state or non-state) charity,
or else as objects of an active construction of social differentiation. Stratifi-
cation and segregation have of course been inherent to social provisioning
systems since time immemorial — a common observation in the field of
social policy. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of segregation was on the defen-
sive for several post-war decades and the goal of universalism was at least
the target of most countries, even if only achieved by a few. However, there
has been a more recent reassertion of segregation as accepted best practice,
18. This concluding section draws from the conclusion of Fischer (2018).
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or at least second-best practice given the perceived impossibilities of inte-
grating large informal sectors into existing social security systems and/or of
universalizing the latter,19 even though the very retreat from such long-term
objectives was arguably a crucial contributing factor to the exacerbation of
informality in the first place.
Social protection for the informal is then turned into an issue of charity
or unilateral redistributive transfers, as is suggested by the now-accepted
terminology of ‘non-contributory’ social protection (which is a factually in-
accurate term because the poor do contribute to the state revenues that pay for
these transfers, albeit not directly through contributions to formally defined
social security institutions). Indeed, this association of social protection with
charity is emphasized by several of the contributions to this Debate section,
particularly with reference to religiously informed right-wing ideologies.
The appeal is that such segregationist tendencies appear progressive, pop-
ulist and so-called ‘pro-poor’, to the extent that isolating the poor is justified
in order to better concentrate resources and interventions on them and to
filter out the undeserving and the un-needy. This is in contrast to the per-
ceived deservingness of social security contributors, rentiers or those who
make profits, which leads to an increasingly smug protectionism from them
towards the encroachment of poor people into their benefits.
However, the dual pressures to both ‘reform’ (i.e. retrench) social security
systems and to refine the targeting of social protection for the poorest,
reinforces the tendency in most parts of the world for a very large uncovered
and unsecured middle, typically the middle three quintiles of the population,
as discussed for instance by ILO (2017; see Alfers andMoussie´, Assessment,
this issue). Indeed, this point brings us back to the observation that the
impulse for rising new-right movements generally derives precisely from
such middle strata of the population. These are not necessarily ‘middle
classes’ (except by intellectually vacuousWorld Bank definitions) and many
would be classified as poor, near-poor or vulnerable in many countries,
particularly poorer countries. The reasons why such social strata would
line up with right-wing political agendas that simultaneously exacerbate
their insecurity — as dramatically highlighted in the December 2019 UK
elections — continues to be a major challenge for social theory. However,
the situation is arguably similar to the first decades of the 20th century when
workers of the world did not unite, but instead rallied behind their respective
national ruling classes, only to be twice sent out to slaughter each other.
It might be argued that this tendency has been counteracted by the increas-
ing acceptance of the idea of a Social Protection Floor, as recently adopted
by the UN, which asserts that a basic universal minimum can be set and
that receiving it is a question of rights, not charity. As noted earlier, even
the World Bank and the IMF have seemed to come around to the idea of
19. See this view, for example, in Levy (2008, 2018) and tentatively in Barrientos (2019).
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universalism. However, as argued by Fischer (2012, 2018) and Martinez
Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea (2016), of crucial importance is the extent
to which the idea of universalistic social policy has been watered down to
its most minimalist connotation (as is common in UN and ILO positions)
or appropriated by agendas that are not, in reality, particularly universalis-
tic (as with the World Bank positioning). In the case of the World Bank,
‘universalism’ is generally conceived as being achieved as long as everyone
has access to something, regardless of how this is provided. In other words,
even if the middle and upper classes access health and education services
privately, and have access to generous social security benefits, in contrast
to poor people who access poorly funded and poor-quality public systems
of provisioning, this would be considered to be a ‘universal’ system.20 This
interpretation is also implicit in the special issue of The Economist (2018)
on universal healthcare. It thereby includes the vast swath of private provi-
sioning in health and education to the unsecured middle 50–60 per cent of
populations in most lower- and middle-income countries as part of a ‘uni-
versal’ provisioning system (the same applies to private insurance systems
as part of universal social protection, etc.). Given that almost all systems,
even in the poorest countries, usually have at least some very rudimentary
public health and schooling systems for the poorest, alongside private provi-
sioning for anyone who can afford it, this makes it very easy to prematurely
celebrate the achievement of universal health and education for all, as has
become a common platitude to which even UN and ILO conventions have
often succumbed.21 Such sleights of narrative are impressive in the way
that they co-opt or hijack progressive concepts, although they do not refute
that fact that, within these agendas, targeting through segregated systems of
provisioning continues to be promoted. Indeed, it is even packaged as part
of a rights-based agenda whereby targeting poor people somehow plays a
role in enacting rights-based entitlements to social protection.22
In contrast, the segregationist tendencies actually practised in neoliberal
approaches to social policy, and theways that right-wing populistmovements
have adopted and extended these practices, clearly emerge from conservative
impulses to preserve the existing hierarchical social order and to discipline
those who find themselves subordinate within this order. As such, they have
deep and long-lasting consequences on social inequalities, on conceptions
and practices of citizenship, on dynamics of formality/informality, and on
trajectories of development more generally. These consequences need to be
20. This precise definition of universalism was explained to me by the social protection expert
of a country office of the World Bank in Asia during fieldwork in March 2018 (country
undisclosed for reasons of confidentiality).
21. Again, see Martinez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea (2016) for some excellent discussion
and examples of this.
22. See Fischer (2013) for a discussion of the ambiguity of rights-based approaches along these
lines.
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taken into account as we ponder the possibilities of post-neoliberal futures
within contexts of entrenched high inequality and increasingly reactionary
politics, in which segregationism may turn out to be far more endemic and
enduring than neoliberal forms of governance.
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